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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDITH CHLOE MATHIE, 
Pla~ntiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
1VILLIAM TRUMAN MATHIE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
. Case No. 9345 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts summarizes the nature 
of the controversy between the parties. It is incomplete 
in many respects or it unduly emphasizes certain facts 
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taken out of context or draws conclusions not justified 
by the record. Therefore, defendant will outline the facts 
as he sees them. 
Plaintiff was awarded a decree of divorce from de-
fendant. However, the acts of defendant were not aggra-
vated and thereby lost no rights to a property distribu-
tion (R. 120). 
The parties were married February 28, 1946. The 
defendant is 53 years of age (R. 75), taught school for 
two years (R. 75) but most of his adult life worked at 
_ .. various occupations. At the time of the divorce, he was 
a truck driver for a cleaning company, receiving a gross 
salary of $60.00 per week (R. 76). The plaintiff is 52 
years of age and the mother of grov~-rn daughters (R. 37-
38) from prior marriages. Both parties had been previ-
ously n1arried and divorced, the plaintiff hvice and the 
defendant once. The plaintiff has a background of civil 
service employment and, at the tin1e of the divorce, was 
employed by the Utah Liquor Commission (R. 36) at a 
gross salary of $260.00 per month (R. 51). Both par-
ties suffer from heart conditions (Ex. 1 and 2), the de-
fendant having suffered a heart attack prior to plaintiff 
filing the action and had not fully recovered to resume 
employnwnt -when the action \Yas filed. 
The only property involved is a unit located on 
Seventh East Street in Salt Lake City. Utah, consisting 
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3 
of two buildings, one which is a house and one which has 
four apartment units, but each building is separated from 
the other, althoug~ the same heating plant is piped into 
both buildings. The house was rented for $85.00 per 
month (R. 63) and the parties resided in one of the apart-
ments in the other building and rented the three remain-
ing apartlnents for $45.00 per month each (R. 62). De-
fendant had found the property for sale which "\Yas pur-
ehased for $13,500.00 and the plaintiff advanced the ini-
tial do·wn pay1nent of $4,000.00 (R. 61). Defendant 1nade 
improveinents on the property costing approximately 
$2300.00, ·which helped to enhance the market value of 
the property to $25,000.00 (R. 91). The improvements 
were paid from defendant's own income (R .68-69), but 
the taxes, utilities, repairs, monthly payments, and other 
expenses were paid from the rents. Plaintiff always col-
lected the rents and made the disbursements. Defendant 
did chores such as mowing the lawn, fixing gaskets, fur-
nace and other odds and ends necessary. The rental 
units were unfurnished. 
Plaintjff's complaint was filed on October 13, 1959 
(R. 2) and on the same date, October 13, 1959, the plain-
tiff deeded the property to her daughter. Although the 
deed recites October 13, 1949 (R. 19), unquestionably the 
1949 was typographical error. Plaintiff was employed 
and all the units were rented and there was no necessity 
for the allleged sale (R. 30). 
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Plaintiff had obtained record title to the property 
as result of a divorce action filed in August of 1953 (R. 
53), which was terminated in December of the same 
year by the defendant conveying to the plaintiff the fee 
to the property as result of an agreement partly oral 
(R. 73) and partly written (Ex. 2) whereby the plaintiff 
recited she had executed a will (Ex. 1) leaving the de-
fendant a life estate in the property. Defendant had been 
assured, prior to the execution of the will, by the plain-
tiff and her counsel, that plaintiff would be protected 
in the property for life (R. 73). 
The decree of the Court awarded possession of the 
house to plaintiff (R. 147) and of the apartments to the 
defendant (R. 147). Both parties were awarded a life 
estate in the property and the plaintiff and her heirs 
were awarded the remainder (R. 148). The decree fur-
ther provided, in the event the parties Inutually agreed 
to sell the property, the net sales price would be distri-
buted as follow·s: One-half of the net sales price plus 
$2,500.00 to plaintiff and one-half of the net sales price 
less $2,500.00 to defendant (R. 147-148), thereby giving 
plaintiff $5,000.00 1nore than defendant and not $2,500.00 
rnore as stated in Page 3 of plaintiff's brief. Before sale, 
the rents and expenses were to be enjoyed and borne by 
each part)r E'qnally (R. 147). The details of the decree 
in diRpute will be discussed hereafter in defendant's 
argun1ent of points. 
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STATE1IENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE FINDINGS AND DECREE OF THE COURT 
AWARDED ·TO DEFENDANT THE INTEREST IN THE 
APARTMENT AND HOME AS PROVIDED IN THE ORAL 
AND WRITTEN RECONCILIATION AGREEMENT AND ARE 
ACCORDING TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW. 
POINT II. 
'THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTY IS EQUIT-
ABLE AND JUST. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT'S DECREE IS NOT UNCERTAIN, NOR 
AMBIGUOUS, NOR INEQUITABLE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE FINDINGS AND DECREE OF THE COURT 
AWARDED ·TO DEFENDANT THE INTEREST IN THE 
APARTMENT AND HOME AS PROVIDED IN THE ORAL 
AND \VRITTEN RECONCILIATION AGREEMENT AND ARE 
ACCORDING TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW. 
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Plaintiff cites authorities to support her argument. 
None of the cases have a fact situation similar to the one 
at bar. The cases discuss the general law as applied in 
the particular jurisdiction to reconciliation agreements 
and the respective courts hold such agreements valid or 
invalid depending on the facts as developed in each case. 
Defendant agrees many jurisdictions uphold recon-
ciliation agreements when not tainted in smne way. Other 
jurisdictions look upon such agreements ''lith disfavor. 
\Ve need not concern ourselves with the latter cases for 
the decree of the trial court fully confonns to the law 
as discussed in the cases cited hy plaintiff and to the 
l::nv interpreting contracts. 
Defendant did not intend to give plaintiff an un-
enculnbered fee of the property when he signed the agree-
Inent (Ex. 2). 
Prior to the execution of the agreement, the plaintiff 
and defendant discussed the matter of an agreement (R. 
73). The defendant was asked as follows: 
Q. \Vhen was there a eonversation about the 
agreementf 
A. \Vell, it wasn't too long after that until my 
wife said we could make it, she would be will-
ing to emne back and live with me if I would 
sign the deed over to her, that she· would make 
an agreement wherein I would be protected. 
That's exactly the words she told me. I said 
wrhnt is all right. it js okeh with me." 
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The agreement (Ex. 2) was prepared by plaintiff's 
attorney (R. 73). This is what took place in his office: 
A. . .. We went down to her attorney and made 
out the agreement first and I asked just ex-
actly what it meant. He told me in these exact 
words, "The deed is in your wife's name." 
She was the owner of the property but that 
"You would have a place to stay as long as 
you live," and I signed the agreement and 
then the deed was put over into my wife's 
name. 
The plaintiff vvanted the property in her own nmne. 
'rhere can he no dispute about this. She told hin1 he 
would be ''protected." Her lawyer drew the agree1nent; 
the defendant wanted to know what it meant. The lawyer 
gave assurance it meant defendant would have a place 
to stay for life. 
Paragraph 2 of the agreen1ent (Ex. 2) supports de-
fendant. It reads as follov,'s: 
"That Edith Chloe Mathie has this day exe-
cuted her last will and testament leaving said 
property to her two daughters, subject to a life 
estate granted to her husband, William Truman 
:Jr athie.'' 
This clause is only an assertion of what plaintiff did as a 
fact. The agremnent is silent as to why she executed it. 
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Only one conclusion can be drawn from her act- that the 
will was a part of the protection for life the defendant 
retained in the property. 
The trial court did not make a new contract for the 
parties. It is permissable to supply the things which were 
omitted in the agreement if the part omitted is not incon-
sistent with the writing but independent of and in addi-
tion to it. (12 Am. Juris. 78, Par. 235, 92 A.L.R. 240. 
Harvey v. Richmond, F. & P.R. Com.162 Va. 49,173 SE 
351, 92 A.L.R. 240.) 
The finding of the trial court is not inconsistent but 
simply supplied a very material omission from the writ-
ten_ agreement which the parties had intended and dis-
cussed orally (R. 73). 
Defendant wanted protection during all of his life, 
not simply in the contingency of surviving plaintiff. 
Ownership of the fee is what the plaintiff desired and got, 
but neither party intended to preclude the defendant 
from enjoying a beneficial interest in the property while 
alive. Plaintiff recognized defendant's beneficial interest 
for life since the Virill (Ex. 1) granting him a life interest 
is not limited to the contingency the parties were still 
n1arried at the time of plaintiff's demise. 
After the reconciliation, the conduct of the parties 
towards the property was the same as before the recon-
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ciliation. Plaintiff continued to collect the rents, make 
pay1nents on the purchase price and other expenses from 
the rents received. Defendant mowed the lawn, fixed gas-
kets, worked on the furnace and did the odds and ends 
in and about the property (R. 66, 67). 
The other provisions in the decree pertaining to the 
property give effect to the decree. Defendant's life estate 
entitles hin1 to a portion of the net rents, but should the 
parties Inutually agree to sell the property, his life estatn 
would tenninate, so he would be entitled to be emnpen-
~atPd for hi~ intPrcst. 
Defendant did not breach the agreement. Ho-..\7 ever, 
there was a breach of the agreen1ent in the case at bar 
hy plaintiff. Plaintiff deliberately conveyed the property 
to her daughters with the intent to defeat defendant's in-
terest in the property. Plaintiff, by the conveyance, 
would hav\' been unable to perform one of the provisions 
()f thr agreement leaving defendant a life estate in the 
1n·operty hy will. 
Defendant found no case similar to that at bar, nor 
one where the plaintiff ·who benefited by the reconcilia-
tion agreen1ent later breached a provision thereof. The 
<>ourt, however, having equity po\vers in this type of ac-
tion, C'an req:1ire the breach to he repaired, if at all possi-
ble. Plaintiff now has the property in her name again 
;:nd has repaired the breach so that the decree of the 
<>ourt di8tributing the property can be enforced. 
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POINT II. 
'THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTY IS EQUIT-
ABLE AND JUST. 
Plaintiff contends the Findings of Fact and Decree 
relating to the home and apartment house, together with 
the court's comments, evidence considerable vindictive-
ness. 
Counsel for plaintiff admits the conveyance by plain-
tiff to her daughter for a consideration of $700.00 could 
not be condoned and was ill advised. He states the matter 
has been corrected. We presume he means plaintiff now 
has the property back in her name. Then he contends 
that, as a result of the uncondoned and ill-advised con-
veyance, the trial judge became vindictive and distributed 
the property inequitably and unjustly. The comments of 
the trial judge were pertinent and to the point but we 
need not concern ourselves with the1n for the distribu-
tion itself is the best evidence of his fairness. 
The real con1plaint of the plaintiff is not the vindic-
tiveness of the trial judge but that she did not receive all 
of the property. The defendant found the property and 
it was purchased for $13,500.00. True, the plaintiff made 
the down payment of $4,000.00, but the defendant, with 
his own funds totaling $2300.00, exclusive of his own 
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labor, 1nade i1nprovements which helped to enhance its 
value. The Inarket value of the property is now $25,-
000.00. The payments on the purchase, after the initial 
down payment and other expenses, were paid from rents. 
The defendant did the odd jobs around the property 
while, except for the initial payment, plaintiff's contribu-
tion to help enhance the value of the property consisted 
in Rpending smne of the m.oney received from rents. The 
court recognized the direct payment of the plaintiff and 
the i1nprove1nents made by the defendant by giving the 
plaintiff $5,000.00 rnore jn the event the property is sold. 
Both parties benefited by living on the premises. Taking 
into ('Onsi.deration that the defendant had been joint 
owner with the plaintiff frmn the time of purchase to 
1953, to say such distribution is inequitable and vindica-
tve is a shocking and unconscienab1e statement. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT'S DECREE IS NOT UNCERTAIN, NOR 
AMBIGUOUS, NOR INEQUITABLE. 
vV e cannot follow plantiff's argument on Pages 10, 
11 and 12 of her brief. The Decree unequivocably gave 
the defendant possession of the apartment and to the 
plaintiff the house (R. 147) but, in the event the property 
was not sold ·while defendant was alive, having used the 
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premises for living and their normal pursuits of life, 
the fee was to he distributed to plaintiff, her heirs, de-
visees and legatees (R. 148). 
The plaintiff could live in the house (R. 147). Noth-
ing was said about defendant living in the apartment 
house, but, since he was given possession thereof, (R. 
14 7), there is no reason why he could not do so. There 
is no dispute that each party was given possession of 
their respective units. The only question is how the 
rents and expenses were to be deter1nined. Plaintiff 
claims certain ambiguities on this point. These alleged 
a1nbiguities the trial judge found were not grounds for 
a new trial but he was ·willing to clarify whatever was 
shown to be necessary (R. 136). He invited respective 
counsel to get together and stipulate to any points need-
ing clarification and recmnmend how best to accomplish 
the same within the intention of 'the Court (R. 136). The 
. court was not delegating the task to the attorneys. He 
just wanted the attorneys to agree on the points upon 
which his action, if any, was desired, and suggest the 
necessary language which, if within the intention of the 
court, he· could incorporate in the Decree or not as he saw 
. fit. Such procedure is not unusual but desirable. It not 
only saves time but the points in question would be de-
lineated for orderly argu1nent. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
Counsel for defendant does not believe the Decree is 
ambiguous, although several details need clarification 
and the ·trial judge was willing to clarify them. Plain-
tiff's counsel refused to give the trial judge the courtesy 
of doing so and now complains of ambiguity. 
Defendant realizes the Decree raises certain adminis-
trative problems which can be simplified. Certain sug-
gestions were made to plaintiff's counsel prior to argu-
ment on the motion for new trial and the same would 
have been suggested to the trial judge, had the oppor-
tunity arisen. Defendant's counsel received the impres-
sion during the argument on the motion for a new trial 
that counsel were to discuss various matters and return 
to the court, at which time the suggestions would have 
been presented, but, since counsel for plaintiff refused 
to discuss the matter further with the trial judge, the 
suggestions were not presented. We believe the following 
suggestions are within the intention of the Decree and 
would clarify all alleged ambiguities. We submit them 
for your consideration. That each of the parties have 
sole possession of their respective units as set forth in 
the Decree ; that plaintiff reside in the house which has 
a rental value of $85.00, if she desires, or rent 1he same, 
keep the rents and pay the expenses thereon whether she 
lives therein or not; that defendant may occupy one of 
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the apartment units, which has a rental value of $45.00, 
chosen by him in the apartments rent free; that he col-
lect the rents at the apartment house, pay the expenses 
of maintaining the apartments, and the net rents from 
the apartments be divided between the plaintiff and de-
fendant. 
CONCLUSION 
Th~ property rights of the parties are vital to each 
of them. The record in every way justifies the award 
made to the defendant and the Decree is just and equit-
able. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent 
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